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SELECTING THE PRESIDENT:   
A BAD IDEA OUT THERE IN CALIFORNIA 
Robert W. Bennett∗ 
California, like all states but two, chooses its electors in a single state-
wide winner-take-all contest.  California has been reliably Democratic in 
recent presidential elections, and the result is that neither major party candi-
date has seen fit to campaign in the state, despite the fact that, at fifty-five 
electors, its delegation is the nation’s largest by some measure.  Other 
populous states with a decided political tilt, like Texas, New York and Illi-
nois, are similarly given short shrift in presidential campaigning.  The large 
“swing” states like Florida, Pennsylvania, and Ohio get almost all of the 
general election attention these days from major-party presidential candi-
dates. 
The campaign neglect has apparently rankled in California, and the 
state has become the site of a great deal of reform effort.  The most recent 
proposal1 would change California’s winner-take-all approach to the system 
found in Maine and Nebraska, where all but two of the electors are deter-
mined by the popular vote in individual congressional districts. Maine’s and 
Nebraska’s use of districting (since the 1972 and 1992 elections, respec-
tively) attracts little attention because those states have small numbers of 
electors (and, to boot, the districting has never yielded a split electoral col-
lege delegation in either state).  A major claim on the website of the organi-
zation sponsoring the California move is that this would make the 
presidential elections in the state more “democratic” by making the process 
competitive.  While the problem of competitiveness in California and other 
non-swing states is real, the suggested cure in California—without similar 
action by other states—is a terrible idea. 
Most congressional districts in California, as elsewhere in the country, 
have been produced by political gerrymandering and hence are themselves 
characterized by a decided political tilt.  At best, selecting electors in dis-
trict elections would induce campaigning only in the small number of com-
petitive congressional districts, not in the state as a whole.  Even that 
increase in campaigning would be quite modest, moreover, as small com-
petitive winner-take-all states (New Hampshire, with four electoral votes, 
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might be an example) would represent considerably bigger electoral college 
prizes than any one California district.  And the large swing states would 
continue to represent far more attractive campaign grounds than California.   
For this reason, it seems likely that the real motivation for the reform 
effort is simply to move a good number of California’s electors from the 
Democratic column to the Republican one.  If the proposal were adopted, 
the Republicans might hope to capture perhaps twenty of California’s fifty-
five electoral votes, instead of the present zero.  Without similar reforms in 
other large states, however, this would simply give the Republicans an edge 
in the nation as a whole, rather than move presidential elections in a “de-
mocratic” (with a small “d”) direction.  Thus, adoption in California alone 
would have no particular effect in assuring that the nationwide popular vote 
winner captures the presidency.  And it would leave the competitive situa-
tion around the country essentially unchanged. 
Partisan politics also explains why the measure is being proposed in 
the form of a popular initiative rather than through legislation, which could 
never get through the Democratically controlled California legislature.  But 
this raises another problem.  The Constitution gives power to determine the 
“manner” of choosing electors to the state “legislature,”2 and the Supreme 
Court has never considered whether the word “legislature” in the Constitu-
tion’s electoral college provisions might be construed to encompass direct 
democratic decisionmaking.  The Court has held that the same word in the 
Article V’s amendment provisions does not allow for direct democratic de-
cisionmaking,3 but it has also suggested more leeway in another constitu-
tional use of the same word.4  Taking note of this problem in a recent 
column in the New York Times, Bob Herbert warned that enactment of the 
California districting proposal could invite the federal courts into the mid-
dle of yet another presidential election.5 
If competition for voters throughout the state of California were really 
the goal, two different reforms would hold more promise.  The easier of the 
two to achieve would be awarding the state’s electors in proportion to the 
statewide vote.  This would give each of the two major party candidates 
some incentive to campaign throughout the state, lest the opponent capture 
an extra electoral vote or two.  This too would essentially assure a split 
electoral college delegation for California and hence aid Republicans, per-
haps even more than districting.  As with the proposed reform, however, 
only a small number of electors would truly be in play in a proportionality 
system, and if pursued by initiative, it would, of course, pose the same 
question of the meaning of the word “legislature” as does the districting 
proposal.  But at least the focus of campaign attention in a proportionality 
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state would be on state voters as a whole.  A proportionality initiative went 
down to defeat in Colorado in the 2004 election, but there seems no reason 
why it should fare any less well in California than the current districting 
proposal.6 
Even more effective in stimulating statewide competitiveness would be 
getting on board the nascent effort to have the state’s electors awarded to 
the winner of the nationwide popular vote (once states with a majority of 
the electoral votes have signed on).7  The effort faces a decidedly uphill bat-
tle, and to date it has succeeded only in Maryland.8  But if the nationwide 
vote were determinative, both major party candidates would have plenty of 
incentive to campaign in the state as a whole, since California contains a lot 
of potential voters for each of the major parties.  And if adopted by states 
with the required electoral college majority, candidates would have an in-
centive to campaign everywhere in the country where they thought votes 
could be effectively harvested.  A measure to join this nationwide vote 
movement was passed by the California legislature, but was vetoed by 
Governor Schwarzenegger last year.9  Some diehard proponents of this pro-
posal remain in the state, and seem prepared to keep trying. 
To make the nationwide vote determinative through this route, how-
ever, requires a good number of other states to sign on.  And many states 
will be reluctant, because they would face the prospect that their electors 
would go to a candidate who lost the popular vote in the state.  The measure 
would also raise difficulties in calculating the nationwide vote in a close 
contest—or dealing with challenges to the count—since non-participating 
states with a clear statewide winner would have little incentive to count the 
vote in their states with great care, especially if the preliminary nationwide 
totals seemed to favor the candidate who won in the state.10 
The present California effort teaches important lessons to the nation as 
a whole.  Electoral college decisionmaking is left largely in state hands, but 
decisions made in one state—particularly the populous ones with large 
chunks of electoral votes—can be very important in choosing the president 
and hence have important implications for voters in other states.  And the 
universal embrace by the states of some form of popular election to choose 
electors camouflages complications and technicalities in the process that re-
quire careful attention to reform proposals, particularly given the willing-
 
6  A proportionality measure does present complications that district elections do not, most obvi-
ously the problem of dealing with fractions in divvying up a small whole number of electors by percent-
ages of a much larger popular vote.  The Colorado formula is reproduced in ROBERT W. BENNETT, 
TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 212–13 n.18 (2006).  
7  See id. at 161–78 (chapter ten entitled “Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional 
Amendment”). 
8  H.B. 148, S.B. 634, 423d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (link).  
9  A.B. 2948, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger on Sept. 29, 
2006 (link). 
10  See BENNETT, supra note 6, at 174–76. 
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ness demonstrated in the 2000 election of the United States Supreme Court 
to enter the fray.  Around the nation, the electoral college process is receiv-
ing long overdue attention.  But this latest proposal in California alone is 
not a step toward constructive reform. 
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